IM Cannabis (IMCC): Profile, 2026 Results and the Slil Transaction

IM Cannabis is one of the most internationally visible Israeli cannabis companies — and, in 2026, one of the most distressed. Listed on Nasdaq under IMCC, it spent several years building a two-market business across Israel and Germany. On 29 September 2026 it completed the sale of the European half to an entity controlled by its own chief executive, having reported a 35% revenue decline, a shareholders' deficit and substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. This profile explains what happened and what is left.

This guide is informational and is not investment advice. Figures and corporate actions are point-in-time; verify against the company's filings before making any decision.

What IM Cannabis is

IM Cannabis Corp. (Nasdaq: IMCC) is a medical cannabis operator serving patients in Israel. Until 29 September 2026 it also served Germany, through the European business it has since sold (IM Cannabis, 29 September 2026). It is one of the listed names in our Israeli cannabis companies directory. The company reports in Canadian dollars, which is a frequent source of confusion when its numbers are compared with Israeli peers that report in shekels.

For 2025 the company reported revenue of C$54.7 million, with German revenue up more than 134% to C$36.3 million and positive operating cash flow of C$4.7 million (IM Cannabis, 31 March 2026). Germany — Europe's largest medical cannabis market — had been the growth engine. That engine stalled in 2026.

H1 2026: the numbers

The half-year to 30 June 2026 was severe by any reading (SEC Form 6-K, Exhibit 99.1):

• Revenue: C$16.3 million, down from C$25.2 million in H1 2025 — a decline of C$8.9 million, or 35%.
• Second quarter revenue: C$7.6 million, against C$12.7 million a year earlier — down 40%.
• Gross profit: C$2.9 million, down from C$6.9 million. Gross margin fell from 27% to 18%.
• Net loss: C$6.85 million for the half, or C$0.85 per share, against a near-breakeven C$19,000 loss in H1 2025.

By segment, Israeli revenue fell to C$7.3 million from C$10.7 million, and German revenue to C$9.0 million from C$14.5 million.

Management's explanation of the Israeli decline is the line that deserves the most attention. The company attributes it to "variations in product mix, pricing and volume as well as reduced imports driven in part by cash flow constraints, which negatively impacted sales volumes" (SEC Form 6-K, Exhibit 99.3 — MD&A). In other words, the company did not have enough working capital to buy the product it needed to sell. That is a liquidity problem feeding directly into the revenue line, and it is much harder to reverse than a demand problem.

The German decline is explained two different ways in the same filing — "delays in shipments" in one section, "decreased demand in the markets" in another.

The going-concern warning

The filing is explicit. Under liquidity and capital resources, management states that projected cash flow for the remainder of 2026 "indicates that there is uncertainty regarding whether the Company will generate sufficient funds to continue its operations and meet its obligations as they become due," and concludes: "These conditions raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern" (MD&A).

The supporting balance-sheet position at 30 June 2026:

• Cash of C$1.6 million (C$1.7 million including restricted cash), against total borrowings of C$12.1 million.
• Total assets C$24.7 million; total liabilities C$30.3 million — a shareholders' deficit of C$5.5 million.
• A working capital deficit of C$13.1 million.
• An accumulated deficit of C$276.7 million.

Management states plainly that it "considers liquidity risk to be high." Post-quarter financings have been small and structurally expensive: two convertible notes in July and August 2026 raised roughly US$203,000 and US$225,000 respectively, convertible at a discount to the lowest recent volume-weighted average price and not repayable in cash — instruments that settle in shares and dilute existing holders as the price falls.

The Slil transaction: selling Europe to the CEO

The defining corporate action of 2026 is the disposal of the European business — and its structure is why it warrants scrutiny.

IM Cannabis announced a non-binding letter of intent on 18 June 2026 and entered into a definitive share purchase agreement dated 16 August 2026 to sell all of the issued and outstanding shares of I.M.C. Holdings Ltd. to Slil.com Holding Ltd. (PR Newswire, 17 August 2026).

The terms:

• Before closing, a pre-closing reorganisation moves the company's Israeli operations out of IMC Holdings, so that IMC Holdings is left holding the European assets — principally Adjupharm GmbH in Germany, plus interests in Xinteza API Ltd. and Shiran Societe Anonyme.
• Consideration consists of C$3 million in advance payments already made by Slil and an affiliate, together with Slil's assumption of retained liabilities "which shall not materially exceed C$9,400,000 in the aggregate." No additional cash is payable to the company at closing, and no securities are issued or exchanged.
• The company expects the deal to improve shareholders' equity by approximately C$3 million on a pro forma basis.
• Closing is conditional on the reorganisation, a valid tax certificate from the Israel Tax Authority, and other consents. The outside date for closing was 30 September 2026; the transaction closed on 29 September 2026 following satisfaction or waiver of those conditions (PR Newswire, 29 September 2026).

The governance issue is unavoidable: Slil is beneficially owned and controlled by Oren Shuster, IM Cannabis's own chief executive, who is also a director and a debtholder of the company (MD&A). This is a related-party transaction in which the buyer sits on both sides of the table.

The board has taken the standard mitigations. It commissioned a special committee composed solely of independent directors to review and evaluate the transaction, and retained Beta Finance T.Y.S Ltd., an arm's-length Israeli financial consultancy, to prepare a fairness report. Whether those safeguards produced an arm's-length price is the question shareholders and regulators are left to judge — particularly given that the company receives no cash at closing and that the asset being sold is the one that generated the majority of its revenue.

Note also what the accounts do not say: as at 30 June 2026 the European operations had not been reclassified as discontinued operations or held for sale, consistent with the agreement not being definitive at that reporting date.

Update — the sale has closed. IM Cannabis announced on 29 September 2026 that the transaction had closed, with Slil acquiring IMC Holdings for the C$3 million advance payment previously made, together with the retained liabilities left in IMC Holdings (PR Newswire, 29 September 2026). The closing announcement adds two details that matter for reading the deal:

• The cap on retained liabilities was C$9,400,000, "subject to adjustment by mutual agreement of the parties", and it excludes the direct liabilities of the subsidiaries transferred with IMC Holdings (the "Target Subsidiaries"), to which the cap does not apply.
• Because Slil is controlled by the chief executive, the transaction fell under Canada's related-party rules (MI 61-101). The company relied on the financial-hardship exemptions from both the formal-valuation requirement and the minority-shareholder-approval requirement (sections 5.5(g) and 5.7(1)(e)), on the basis, among other things, that it was in serious financial difficulty. In practice, that means there was no formal valuation and no separate vote of minority shareholders; the company states that Beta Finance's financial analysis did not constitute a formal valuation.

The company said further details would be provided in a material change report.

What is left: the Israeli business

Post-closing, IM Cannabis retains its Israeli medical cannabis operations. That is a business generating roughly C$7.3 million of half-year revenue and a segment loss of C$2.0 million, in a market with a large and reasonably stable patient base — the company's own filing cites 143,900 Israeli patients as of May 2026, comprising 110,900 with licences and 33,000 with prescriptions, a figure consistent with the trend we track in Israel's cannabis patient numbers.

The strategic case is that a smaller, debt-relieved, single-market company can be stabilised where a leveraged two-market one could not. The risk is that what remains is the smaller and currently loss-making half, in a domestic market where competition from larger vertically integrated producers is intensifying and where the company's own import capacity has already been constrained by cash.

How to read it

IM Cannabis is the clearest cautionary counterpoint to InterCure. Both are Nasdaq-listed Israeli cannabis operators of similar vintage. One has spent 2026 consolidating — acquiring, settling a nine-figure war-damage claim and rebuilding capacity. The other is shrinking to survive, having sold its growth engine to its own chief executive for no cash in order to shed liabilities.

The recurring theme in Israeli cannabis that IM Cannabis illustrates is the gap between revenue growth and sustainable profit. Germany grew fast and consumed capital; when shipments slipped and the balance sheet tightened, there was no cushion. For anyone assessing the sector, the lesson is that in a low-margin, import-dependent, price-regulated market, working capital is not a back-office detail — it is the business.

For the broader field, see our Companies hub and the full company directory; for the domestic backdrop, the Israel cannabis market overview; for the trade dynamics, Israel's cannabis export industry and imports and supply; and for the listed-equity view, investing in Israeli cannabis stocks.